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The sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action was
tested by demurrer in Player v. Player.' The complaint alleged
a family agreement under which the mother of the plaintiff and
defendant released her life estate in certain lands devised to her
under her husband's will and put her children, as remaindermen,
in possession of their respective tracts upon condition that each
child should pay to her an annual sum of 200.00 dollars in lieu
of her life estate and said payments by agreement were made a
lien upon the land of each child. It was further alleged that
none of the children made any payment as required under the
agreement except the plaintiff, who provided practically all of
his mother's support for many years, and after her death, filed
a claim against her estate. The complaint further alleged that
the plaintiff's mother repeatedly stated to him that he was to
receive the payment of $200.00 per year from the other re-
maindermen for her support, which he alleged constituted an
equitable assignment of the liens upon the premises. Plaintiff
asked for a foreclosure of his equitable lien upon defendant's land
and for the sale of the same to satisfy defendant's portion of the
obligation for the support of their mother.
Defendant demurred both individually and in his representa-
tive capacity upon the grounds, (a) that the facts alleged did
not constitute an equitable assignment of the mother's lien and
(b) no action was alleged against defendant in his representa-
tive capacity. In the alternative defendant demurred on the
ground of misjoinder of an action against him individually and
one against him as administrator. The lower court sustained the
demurrer for insufficiency upon both grounds and did not pass
upon the alternate ground.
The sole question on appeal, which resulted in reversal, was
whether or not the complaint stated a proper cause of action for
foreclosure of an equitable lien based upon an assignment to the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court reiterated the established rule
that, in passing upon a demurrer, the court is limited to a con-
sideration of the pleading under attack and that the facts alleged
* Attorney at Law, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. 240 S.C. 274, 125 S.E.2d 636 (1962).
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will be liberally construed along with relevant inferences deduc-
ible therefrom. The court in upholding the sufficiency of the
complaint, concluded that the allegations respecting the equitable
assignment of the lien presented factual issues to be determined,
not only from the words used, but from all the facts and sur-
rounding circumstances.
,Sossamo v. LittleohAn2 was an action to compel specific per-
formance of an alleged contract for the sale of defendant's one-
half interest in a partnership, based upon correspondence between
the partners. The defendant demurred on the ground that the
complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action for specific performance since it appeared from the com-
plaint that the correspondence did not result in a binding con-
tract of sale. The order of the circuit judge overruling the de-
murrer directed that an appeal therefrom would not operate as a
stay of further proceedings for determination of the issues on the
merits, pursuant to Section 7-422 of the 1952 Code. Both the
special referee and the trial judge before whom the case was tried
considered themselves bound by the previous order and accord-
ingly decreed specific performance. The Supreme Court con-
fined the appeal to a consideration of the correctness of the origi-
nal order overruling the demurrer and did not consider questions
arising on the merits. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme
Court concluded that the correspondence did not constitute a
binding contract for the sale of the defendant's interest in the
partnership. The original offer was construed as implying a cash
transaction; the purported acceptance was qualified by the pro-
position that payment be made within sixty days. This was held
to constitute a counter-proposal which, not having been accepted,
did not result in the consummation of the contract.
The demurrer challenging the sufficiency of the complaint to
state a cause of action was sustained by the lower court and af-
firmed on appeal in Smith v. Citizens & So. Nat'Z Bank.3 The
theory of the complaint was that the bank had unlawfully inter-
fered with plaintiff's contractual relations with his partner re-
sulting in damages to him. The pertinent allegations were that
the plaintiff was indebted to the bank, that the bank had made
a demand upon plaintiff's partner to include his name on a check
to be issued in settlement of their accounts, and that the partner
2. 241 S.C. 478, 129 S.E.2d 124 (1963).
3. 241 S.C. 285, 128 S.F2d 112 (1962). This case is also noted in the Torts
section at note 14.
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subsequently refused to make payment because of the bank's
interference.
The Supreme Court recognized that the unlawful interference
with a contractual relationship is actionable where the damages
are the proximate result of the acts complained of. It concluded,
however, under the allegations of the complaint, that plaintiff's
loss resulted from his partner's refusal to pay under any cir-
cumstances and not from any action on the part of the bank.
In Linder v. Fireman's Ins. Co.,4 the order of the lower court
overruling defendant's demurrer to the complaint was reversed
on appeal. The issue involved the construction of an insurance
contract, consisting of a fire policy and attached forms, to de-
termine coverage as to damage by windstorm to trees on insured's
premises and the expense of removing debris resulting from such
damage. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no am-
biguity in the policy respecting damage to trees by windstorm.
Under its plain provisions, such damage was not covered, and
therefore the claim for expense of removing the debris would
necessarily fail as well.
In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Park,5 action was brought to
recover the difference between freight rates erroneously quoted
and charged on three interstate shipments, and the lawful rates
published by the carriers and approved by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. By counterclaim, defendants sought to re-
cover damages sustained by reason of having settled a fire loss
on one shipment on the basis of the misquoted freight rates,
alleging reliance upon the misquotation and the negligence of the
carrier in failing for an unreasonable time to correct its error.
The order of the circuit judge sustaining a demurrer to the
counterclaim was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court con-
cluded, on the basis of the authorities, that the defendants had
no right to rely on the railroad's quotation of rates since they
were presumed to know the published rates. In the absence of a
right of reliance, the counterclaim would fail, whether based
upon misquotation or delay in correcting the error.
The appeal in Hopkins v. Fidelity Ins. Co.6 was from the order
of the circuit judge overruling defendant's demurrer to the com-
4. 240 S.C. 331, 125 S.E.2d 645 (1962). This case is also noted in the In-
surance section at note 8.
5. 241 S.C. 207, 127 S.E.2d 622 (1962).
6. 240 S.C. 230, 125 S.E.2d 468 (1962). This case is also noted in the In-
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plaint and denying in part its motion to strike certain allega-
tions therefrom. The complaint, based upon fraud and deceit,
alleged that plaintiff, an illiterate woman, had been induced by
misrepresentations of defendant's agents to sign a release for the
wrongful death of her child based upon inadequate consideration
and had thereby forfeited her legal right to recover fair com-
pensation to which she was entitled. The demurrer questioned
the sufficiency of the complaint on the ground that it showed
upon its face that plaintiff had suffered no damages by reason
of the acts complained of. In concluding that the demurrer
should have been sustained, the Supreme Court reasoned (a) that
the complaint was lacking in factual allegations that a cause of
action existed since it failed to allege that the child's death was
the result of negligence; and (b) assuming that such a cause of
action did exist, and the release of plaintiff's interest as a statu-
tory beneficiary was procured by fraud, she sustained no dam-
age thereby since her cause of action would not be barred by a
release fraudulently procured. Its validity could be attacked by
the child's personal representative in whom the action was vested
by statute.7
In Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. BaZey,s the appeal was
from the order of the trial judge overruling a demurrer to the
counterclaim interposed by defendant. The complaint charged
defendant with violating a contract under the terms of which
plaintiff was to purchase certain accounts, agreements and chat-
tel mortgages from defendant, and prayed for an accounting, a
money judgment and certain equitable relief. Defendant's coun-
terclaim charged the plaintiff with libel in that plaintiff had
written a letter to defendant's customers inquiring as to the
balance owed and directing that payments on the accounts in
the future be made only to plaintiff. The defendant alleged that
this letter was libelous in that it questioned defendant's honesty
and integrity. The demurrer challenged the sufficiency of the
counterclaim to state a cause of action for libel. In holding that
the demurrer should have been sustained, the Supreme Court
noted that a demurrer admits the facts alleged in the complaint
but not necessarily the inferences drawn from such facts and
the court must determine if the language used can reasonably be
construed to have the meaning attributed to it. In light of the
7. S.C. CODE § 10-1952 (1952).
8. 241 S.C. 64, 127 S.E.2d 8 (1962). This case is also noted in the Torts
section at note 8.
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contract between the parties, which was a part of the record, the
court concluded that the plaintiff was authorized to write the
letter complained of and there was nothing to show a malicious
intent to injure defendant.
The nature of an action in claim and delivery and whether or
not the issues were legal or equitable determined the court's rul-
ing on demurrer in Haverty Furniture Co. v. Worthy.9 Plaintiff
brought action in the Civil and Criminal Court of Charleston in
claim and delivery for possession of certain furniture and ap-
pliances sold to defendant under a conditional sales contract.
Joined as parties were the owner of a warehouse to which the
property had been removed and the agents of the landlord who
had levied a distress for rent in arrears against the property. The
latter defendants made the only appearance and demurred on
jurisdictional grounds, contending that the issues were equitable
in nature and by statute specifically excluded from the jurisdic-
tion of said court. They also moved to strike the allegations of
the complaint charging them with actual notice of plaintiff's lien,
on the ground that actual notice of its existence was irrelevant to
the determination of the issue as to priority of the liens. Both
the demurrer and motion were decided adversely to defendants.
The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that an action in claim
and delivery is one at law governed by statute. The issue as to
priority of lien between plaintiff under its conditional sales con-
tract and defendant under the distress for rent was held to rest
upon legal rights declared by statute and no equitable issues were
presented. As to the motion to strike, the court held that the
question of actual notice is covered by statute, which expressly
refers to "actual notice of any unpaid purchase money lien," and
would include the conditional sales contract under which plain-
tiff was claiming.10
In Oxman v. Profitt" defendant appealed from the order of the
trial judge overruling a demurrer to the complaint and denying
motions to make the complaint more definite and certain and to
require plaintiff to state separately an alleged multiplicity of
causes of action. The complaint alleged that defendant entered
into an employment agreement with plaintiff to act as its agent
9. 241 S.C. 369, 128 S.E.2d 707 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Commercial Transactions section at note 29 and in the Property section at
note 20.
10. S.C. CoDE § 41-155 (1952).
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to solicit contracts of insurance, under the terms of which he
agreed not to work for another company engaged in the same
business while in plaintiff's employ and, after termination of his
employment, not to induce other agents to terminate their em-
ployment with plaintiff nor policy holders to terminate their
insurance. It was alleged that after terminating his employment
with plaintiff, defendant formed another corporation and at-
tempted to violate the restrictive covenants. Defendant's demur-
rer challenged the validity of the covenants on the ground of in-
definiteness as to time and place and as not being necessary for
plaintiff's protection. The Supreme Court held that the covenants
in question were not covenants not to compete and found no
invalidity therein. As to the motion to require separate statement
of the alleged causes of action, the court ruled that only one
primary right was alleged to have been violated and hence only
one cause of action was stated. The order refusing defendant's
motion to require the complaint to be made more definite and
certain by stating the counties in which defendant worked while
in plaintiff's employ was also affirmed on the ground that the
complaint adequately apprised defendant of the exact nature of
the charges. The court noted, too, that such motion is not ap-
pealable until final judgment.
In Winter v. United States Fid. &Guar. Co.12 an action was
brought by the receiver of a subcontractor under a road construc-
tion contract against the principal contractor, the corporate
surety who had executed a performance bond, and the holder of
a mortgage on certain equipment who had repossessed the same.
The complaint sought damages for breach of contract and an ac-
counting as to amounts due the subcontractor. It also alleged an
action in tort against all the parties on the theory of a conspiracy
to bring about a breach of the contract. Demurrer was inter-
posed by two defendants on the ground that several inconsistent
causes were improperly joined. It was contended that the action
for damages for breach of contract was inconsistent with the
action for an accounting, which presupposed the performance
and validity of the contract. It was also urged that the cause of
action in tort for conspiracy could not be joined with an action
in contract. The third defendant moved to make the complaint
more definite and certain in certain particulars. The lower court
overruled the demurrer and refused the motion.
12. 240 S.C. 561, 126 S.E.2d 724 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the causes of action
were not inconsistent and were properly joined under Section
10-701 of the 1952 Code. In one cause of action, plaintiff sought
an accounting for that part of the contract which had been per-
formed and this was held to be an affirmation rather than a re-
pudiation of the contract. The allegations charging the defend-
ant with conspiracy to prevent performance of the contract were
also held to be an affirmation thereof. The causes of action were
held to arise out of a transaction connected with the contract
which was the subject of the action and hence properly joined.
The order refusing to make the complaint more definite and cer-
tain was affirmed for the reason that the exception challenging
this ruling was too general and indefinite to be considered under
the rules of the Supreme Court.13 The Supreme Court noted that
neither of the demurrers raised the objection that the complaint
improperly joined several causes of action which did not affect
all of the parties to the action.
PLEA IN ABATEMENT
An interesting question as to whether or not a tort action may
be abated because of the pendency of a prior action involving
the same parties in another county was treated at length in
Collins v. Johnson.'4 A passenger bus company brought action
in Florence County to recover property damages resulting from
a collision between its bus and an automobile owned by the in-
dividual defendant. The defendant in that action did not counter-
claim but thereafter brought action in Darlington County against
the bus company and its driver for damages to the automobile
and for personal injuries resulting from the same collision. The
bus company and its agent both moved to abate the action in
Darlington County by reason of the pendency of the prior action
in Florence County. The trial judge sustained the plea in abate-
ment on behalf of the company but denied the motion on behalf
of the driver and both parties appealed from his order. The
company contended that Section 10-652 of the 1952 Code provides
for the filing of a mandatory counterclaim where it arises out
of the same set of facts, as opposed to the view that this section
is permissive. The Supreme Court held that the question was
controlled by Section 10-705 of the 1952 Code which does not re-
13. S.C. Sup. Ct R. 4(6).
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quire a compulsory counterclaim but permissively accords to
a defendant the right to interpose a counterclaim founded on
tort, if both actions arise out of the same set of facts. The plain-
tiff may assert his claim in an independent action if he so elects.
The order of the trial judge abating the action was accordingly
reversed as to the company and affirmed as to the driver. The
court recognized that a plaintiff has an election to sue joint tort
feasors separately or to join them as parties defendant in a
single action.
MOTION TO STRIKE
Kinard v. PoW,5 was an action to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained by plaintiff in a collision between an
automobile driven by plaintiff and one driven by defendant. The
defendant pleaded res adjudicata as a bar, alleging that in a prior
action by a passenger in plaintiff's automobile against the drivers
of both vehicles, a judgment was recovered against both of them.
The trial judge sustained plaintiff's motion to strike this plea
as legally insufficient. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that
the former judgment would not be res adjudicata in a subsequent
action between the drivers of the vehicles involved. The fact that
the co-defendants in the former action could have filed cross-
actions was held to be of no significance, in view of the permis-
sive language of Section 10-707 of the 1962 Code.
The appeal in J.M.S., Inc. v. Theo,16 was from the order of
the trial judge granting plaintiff's motion to strike certain de-
fenses from the answer. The action was brought for damages for
an alleged breach of contract by the defendant in the construc-
tion of a dam on plaintiff's land resulting from the improper
installation of a flood gate. The lower court ordered stricken a
portion of paragraph two of the first defense to the effect that
defendants had not been paid in full for their services under the
contract, had performed extra services for which they had not
been paid, and upon completion the parties had agreed upon a
settlement as to the amount due. Since the complaint was re-
stricted solely to the alleged improper installation of the flood
gate, the Supreme Court held that the foregoing allegations re-
lating to payment or non-payment were properly stricken as im-
material. The court further held that the third defense was
15. 241 S.C. 555, 129 S.E.2d 527 (1963). This case is also noted in the Torts
section at note 16.
16. 241 S.C. 394, 128 S.E.2d 697 (1962).
Vol. 16
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merely a repetition of the allegations contained in the first de-
fense and was properly stricken as redundant.
In Culbreth v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. 17 the correctness of the
order of the trial judge striking certain defenses in the answer
rested upon a determination as to which of two statutes was ap-
plicable to the question of the contestability of an insurance
policy, under which benefits were sought for total disability due
to illness. The defendant denied liability on the grounds that
plaintiff had made fraudulent misrepresentations and concealed
conditions relating to his health in his application for insurance,
and filed a counterclaim to recover benefits previously paid. By
way of reply, plaintiff alleged estoppel to contest the validity of
the policy for alleged false statements in the application, since
more than two years had elapsed from the effective date of the
policy, and at the same time moved to strike said defenses and
counterclaim, relying upon Section 37-161 of the 1952 Code.
Defendant moved to strike from the reply the allegations plead-
ing the foregoing statute as a bar, contending that such defense
was proper under Section 37-471.5 of the 1952 Code which per-
mits a contest at any time of policies of accident and health insur-
ance based upon a fraudulent misstatement in the application.
The lower court granted plaintiff's motion, holding that Section
37-161 of the 1952 Code was applicable to the policy in question
and barred contest of its validity after two years from date. The
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the policy was an acci-
dent and health insurance policy covered by the latter statute
and that the inclusion of accidental death benefits did not make
it life insurance so as to bring it within the purview of the
former.
AMENDMENTS
In Burnett v. Roukedes,18 action was brought in claim and
delivery for possession of an air-conditioning unit, or its value,
and the plaintiff filed the necessary bond and obtained posses-
sion. The defendant served an answer and counterclaim, follow-
ing which plaintiff served notice to require defendant to correct
his pleading in certain particulars, and defendant moved to re-
quire plaintiff to make the complaint more definite and certain
by alleging his security interest. The trial judge entered an order
17. 241 S.C. 46, 127 S.E.2d 132 (1962). This case is also noted in the In-
surance section at note 14.
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requiring defendant to state separately and to designate his
counterclaim and he interpreted the security rights of plaintiff
to mean those under a landlord's lien for rent. Defendant then
demurred to the complaint on the ground that plaintiff could
not enforce a landlord's lien by claim and delivery after ten days
from the removal of the property from the leased premises, rely-
ing upon the distraint statute.19 The demurrer was sustained and
defendant served an amended complaint alleging a conspiracy
between the tenant and his father to defeat plaintiff's right to
distrain by concealing the air-conditioning unit. The trial judge
before whom the case was tried concluded that the defendant
was entitled to judgment on his counterclaim for $750.00, the
agreed value of the property. Plaintiff moved to amend the
judgment, contending that it should be for the return of the
property, or if the same could not be had, for judgment for its
agreed value, and this was refused by the trial judge. On appeal
the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's counterclaim
was an action in claim and delivery, even though defendant did
not ask for return of the property in the prayer, and noted that
the prayer of a complaint or counterclaim is no part thereof
and cannot give character to it. This being the case, the order
of the trial judge should have been in the alternative, for the
return of the property, or in the event possession thereof could
not be had, for its agreed value. In all other respects, the judg-
ment was affirmed.
The question of pleading in Hicks v. Giles20 was the propriety
of the trial judge's refusal of defendant's motion to amend his
answer so as to plead the statute of limitations. The action was
one for accounting and for recovery of sums alleged to be due
under a share-cropping agreement, and was heard under a gen-
eral order of reference. During a second reference in the cause,
the defendant orally moved to be allowed to amend his answer
in the particular noted, contending that the complaint was in-
sufficient to put him on notice that plaintiff would attempt to
prove expenditures during the years 1951 and 1952. The court
held that the complaint was sufficient in this respect and that
the previous order of the circuit judge had concluded the matter
as to defendant's liability during the years in question. The
opinion reiterates the rule that the court's exercise of discretion
19. S.C. CODE § 41-156 (1952).
20. 241 S.C. 129, 127 S.E.2d 196 (1962).
[Vol. 16
10
South Carolina La  Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss1/10
SuRv= oF SouTH CAROLiNA LAw
with reference to allowance of amendments to pleadings, while
not unlimited, is so broad that it will rarely be disturbed.
In Creamer v. City of Anderson,21 the appeal challenged the
correctness of the trial judge's order permitting amendment to
the complaint upon plaintiff's motion made at the conclusion of
the testimony, which was denied by the special referee. The pur-
pose of the action was to challenge the official results of a special
annexation election, the plaintiff's main contention being that
less than the required number of votes legally cast were in favor
of annexation. The amendment allowed by the trial judge was to
show the actual results of the election in the area in question as
certified by the commissioner of elections. The Supreme Court
held that the allegation as to the number of votes was evidentiary
in character and not essential to the statement of plaintiff's cause
of action, and the amendment to state the correct number would
not change the cause of action. The proposed amendment was
held properly allowed by the circuit judge, in consonance with
the general rule that amendments to pleadings are favored in fur-
therance of justice and the determination of controversies on
their real facts.
SHAM DEFENSE
The appeal in Martin v. McLeod22 was from the order of the
circuit judge striking as sham the defense set up in the answer
that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest, since she had
been fully paid for her loss by an insurance company to which
she had assigned her cause of action. The action was one to re-
cover damages to plaintiff's personal property as the result of
fire allegedly caused by defendant's negligence. The correctness
of this ruling depended upon whether or not the transaction be-
tween the plaintiff and the insurance company was one of sub-
rogration. In support of her motion, plaintiff relied upon a "loan
receipt" signed by her, whereby she acknowledged receipt of pay-
ment by the insurance company as a loan to be repaid to the ex-
tent of any net recovery against the third party responsible for
the loss. The Supreme Court held that if the insurance company
had paid the full amount of plaintiff's loss, it would have been
subrogated to her rights against the third party and the defend-
ant's plea in bar would have been good. However, the use of the
21. 240 S.C. 118, 124 S.E.2d 788 (1962).
22. 241 S.C. 71, 127 S.E.2d 129 (1962). This case is also noted in the In-
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loan receipt was a lawful device by which the right of subro-
gation was avoided and under which plaintiff was entitled to
bring action in her own name. The defense was accordingly held
to be properly stricken as sham on plaintiff's motion.
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
B1utova Watch Co. v. Roberts Jewelers23 was an action on an
account for goods sold and delivered. The complaint contained
allegations appropriate to recovery on either of two theories,
(1) that the goods were sold to defendant as an individual, and
(2) that he ordered and received the goods for a non-existent
principal and thereby became personally liable for the purchase
price. The trial judge, before whom the case was tried without
a jury, concluded that the defendant acted as the agent of a
corporation that at least had a de facto existence incurred no
personal liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's individual
liability. With respect to his contention that plaintiff could not
recover against him individually because of the allegation that
he was acting for a non-existent corporation, the court concluded*
that this was simply an attempt to state an alternative theory of
recovery. The court found no real inconsistency in the language
used, since the defendant would be personally liable under either
theory, in application of the rule that one who undertakes to
act for a non-existent principal renders himself personally liable.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES
The principal issue in Lancaster v. Smithco, Inc.24 was wheth-
er or not plaintiffs were barred from maintaining their action
under the doctrine of election of remedies. The complaint al-
leged a breach of the general warranty clause in a deed conveying
real estate resulting in damages by reason of the existence of an
easement for installation of pipe lines across the rear of the
property. The defendant pleaded in bar the fact that plaintiffs
had previously brought another action against it claiming dam-
ages on the thory of fraud and deceit by reason of the existence
of the easement referred to, which was decided adversely to them
on appeal to the Supreme Court. Defendant's motion for judg-
23. 240 S.C. 280, 125 S.E.2d 643 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Agency section at note 1 and in the Corporation section at note 28.
24. 241 S.C. 415, 128 S.E.2d 915 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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ment on the pleadings as to this defense was granted by the
trial judge on the ground of res adjudicata and election of rem-
edies. The Supreme Court held that the granting of a non-suit
in the previous action was not decisive on the merits but was
based upon the ground that the evidence of breach of warranty
did not justify a finding of an intent to deceive; and this would
not support the plea of res adjudicata. The court held further
that an election of remedies presupposes existence of two or more
remedies from which a choice may be made, and the election may
be conclusive where the remedies are inconsistent; however, the
mistaken choice of a fancied remedy on a certain state of facts
is not such an election as will bar subsequent pursuit of another
remedy appropriate to the same state of facts. The court con-
cluded that the choice of improper remedy in the former action,
i.e., fraud and deceit, did not bar the present action for breach
of warranty.
PERMITTING ANSWER
An interesting procedural question as to whether or not the
trial judge properly exercised his discretion in permitting an
answer to be filed after the expiration of the twenty day period
was explored at length in Lee v. Peek2 5 with resulting differ-
ences of opinion as to the proper basis for decision. The action
was brought in Abbeville County to recover damages for libel
against numerous defendants, three of whom were granted a
change of venue to Anderson County upon their motion. These
defendants thereafter demurred to the complaint, following
which plaintiff moved for judgment by default against them. In
response the defendant filed a return and submitted an affidavit
of counsel to the effect that he had acted with due diligence and
in good faith to protect the rights of his clients. The trial judge
denied the motion for judgment and granted defendants an ex-
tension of time to answer, from which order an appeal was taken.
The opinion of Justice Bussey noted that the motion was not
one pursuant to Section 10-1213 of the 1952 Code to be relieved
from a judgment or order taken as a result of "mistake, inad-
vertance, surprise or excusable neglect," but was made prior to
judgment pursuant to Section 10-609 of the 1952 Code. The
language of the latter section permits the court, in its discretion,
to allow an answer to be filed after the expiration of the time
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limit. Judge Bussey was of the opinion that the judge's discre-
tion under this section was almost unlimited except where its
exercise was controlled by an error of law. He suggested affirm-
ance of the lower court ruling on the grounds that there was
nothing in the record to indicate that the lower court was con-
trolled by an error of law in granting the motion nor was there
in the order any factual finding which was without evidentiary
support.
The majority of the court concurred in the result, concluding,
however, that the requirements for granting relief were the same
under both sections referred to. Under both, the area of judicial
discretion was limited by the necessity of a finding of excusable
neglect on the part of counsel. The showing of neglect on the
part of counsel without a proper excuse would be insufficient to
justify exercise of the court's discretion under either section. The
court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the lower
court's ruling that excusable neglect had been shown.
ADDITIONAL PARTIES
In Robinson v. South Carolina Highway Dept.20 defendant ap-
pealed from the order of the trial judge refusing its motion to
bring in as a party defendant the town of Forest Acres so as to
enable the defendant to file a cross-complaint against the town,
and granting plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint. The
plaintiffs claimed damages to their land as the result of changes
made in the drainage system by the highway department along
certain streets, which they alleged constituted a taking of their
property for public use without just compensation. The Supreme
Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying
defendant's motion, since the complaint alleged nine different
acts by defendants as causing a taking of plaintiffs' land, and
the inclusion of the town would increase the complexity of the
issues to be determined by the jury. The defendants were granted
permission to file an answer or otherwise plead to the amended
complaint.
26. 241 S.C. 137, 127 S.E.2d 286 (1962).
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